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The Right to Bear Arms:
A Phenomenon of Constitutional History
RALPH J. ROHNER*
FEw READERS OF ANY PERIODICAL or daily newspaper can be unaware that there
is today much agitation for increased governmental regulation of the sale,
shipment, purchase, ownership, and use of firearms,' and that with each such
eruption there is a vociferous counterattack from individuals and groups who
maintain the desirability and need of a free traffic in firearms. 2 Frequently in
this debate the notion is interjected that somehow extensive regulation of fire-
arms infringes upon a constitutionally-protected "right to keep and bear
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Mr. Robert P. Grabowski, a second-year student at
the Catholic University Law School.
I See, e.g., Bakal, The Traffic in Guns: A Forgotten Lesson of the Assassination, Harpers
Magazine, February 1964, p. 62; Battle of the Guns, Time Magazine, April 16, 1965, p. 24;
Batman, The Case for Registering Guns, Saturday Review, August 1, 1964, p. 18. From
February 9 through April 30, 1965, the Washington Post newspaper, appalled at the number
of accidental and criminal shootings in the District of Columbia area, published seventy-
seven consecutive editorials calling for the enactment of regulations on the sale and purchase
of handguns. On August 1, 1966, the Columbia Broadcasting System's television news coverage
of the sniper killings in Austin, Texas, included an interview with author Carl Bakal (see
footnote 6), who predicted increased pressures for such legislation. Investigation indicated the
sniper had purchased one of the weapons used to slay fifteen persons from a local Sears,
Roebuck Co., store that morning, on credit. The following week, CBS Television News re-
peated a 1964 news special entitled "Murder and the Right to Bear Arms."
The most prominent advocate of firearms regulation on the federal level is Senator Thomas
Dodd (D. Conn.), who has introduced myriad bills which would expand existing federal
firearms legislation. Invaluable insights into the whole area of firearms control can be found
in the 1965 Dodd subcommittee hearings: Hearings on Bills to Amend the Federal Firearms
Act Before the Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., May, June, and July, 1965. [Hereinafter cited as 1965 Dodd Hear-
ings].
2 See, e.g., Starnes, A Handbook for Arm Twisters; Letters to Legislators, Field & Stream,
March 1966, p. 20; Starnes, Anti-gun Extremists Are at it Again, Field & Stream, April 1964,
p. 12; Grahame, Gun Owners Should Switch to the Offense, Outdoor Life, November 1963,
p. 10; Hess, Should You Own a Gun, American Mercury, April 1957, p. 54. And see the testi-
mony of Franklin L. Orth, Executive Vice President, National Rifle Association, in 1965
Dodd Hearings, supra note 1, at 195.
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arms."3 The occasional intimation is that every individual has an undeniable
license to own and carry deadly weapons of almost any description, and that
consequently any legislation which would prevent or limit access to firearms
borders on unconstitutionality. On the other hand, broad federal and state
restrictions do exist, and their constitutionality has almost universally been
sustained; indeed, it has been suggested that despite second amendment pro-
tection for a traditional "right to bear arms," times may change to such a de-
gree that no such basic right can be justified in present circumstances, even
based on our constitutional heritage.
4
Seldom, however, has there been in this debate any searching analysis of
what the "right to bear arms" means, or to what extent the Federal and various
State constitutions protect it. Even the legal literature has been remarkably
silent, although several recent articles have treated the question and reached
diverse conclusions,5 and an articulate non-lawyer has published a full-blown
book on the subject.6 It is proposed, therefore, to discuss the genesis of the
"right to bear arms" as a constitutional provision, the origins and contempo-
raneous development of firearms controls, and the litigation involving both,
with the hope that this discussion may point toward an understanding of the
permissible scope of firearms regulation.7
Most discussions of the right to bear arms-however superficial-begin by
noting the specific language of the second amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides:
A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.
And in various similar provisions, the constitutions of thirty-five states8 guar-
antee expressly the right to bear arms. Though it is submitted below9 that
there may be significant distinctions between the protection afforded by the
federal and state constitutions, for our purposes here we are concerned pri-
'E.g., For a Strong America; Article II, the Bill of Rights, Field & Stream, April 1964, p. 10;
Rummel, To Have and Bear Arms, American Rifleman, June 1964, p. 38.
4 McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12 MARQ. L. REv. 138, 149 (1928): "... it is
quite possible that jurists and publicists may some day universally deny that man has any
inherent natural right to keep and bear arms."
5 Feller & Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 46 (1966);
Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A.J. 554, 665 (1965); Fletcher, The Corresponding
Duty to the Right of Bearing Arms, 39 FLA. B.J. 167 (1965); Hays, The Right to Bear Arms,
A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 Wm. & M. L. REv. 381 (1960).
6 
BAKAL, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1966).
It is obviously impossible in these pages to describe or analyze all the various statutory
restrictions on firearms, both federal and state. An excellent survey may be found in Note,
Firearms Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1362 (1965). See also the following student notes:
15 DE PAUL L. REV. 164 (1965); 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 780 (1964); 98 U. PA. L. REv. 905 (1950).
These provisions are set out in the Appendix, p. 81, infra.
See text at footnotes 83-88.
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marily with the origin of a written constitutional guarantee for a right to bear
arms; it thus seems sufficient to note generally that the state "guarantees" were
for the most part adopted after, and modeled upon, the federal constitution.
On its face the constitutional language ties the "right to keep and bear arms"
to the need for an organized militia. Much of the controversy over the nature
of the right stems directly from that juxtaposition of clauses-i.e., is there any
individual right to keep and bear arms for purposes other than collective
security through a well-organized militia?10 From the polar answers to this
question derive the sundry viewpoints that hunting, target-shooting, personal
self defense, or pure rugged-individualism, do or do not enjoy constitutional
protection.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The language of the second amendment, after some changes in wording by the
various draftsmen," was adopted as part of the Bill of Rights to the Federal
Constitution in 1791.12 It may be recalled that when the federal constitution
was submitted to the states for ratification, several states (notably Virginia
through its convention Member, George Mason) cited the lack of a bill, or
declaration, of basic human rights such as was included in the recent consti-
tutions of a number of the states.' 3 Congress, at its first session, drafted a bill
containing twelve of these basic "items," the last ten of which were ratified by
the States and became our Bill of Rights. The first ten amendments, then, rep-
resented the prevailing view of the thirteen states (nee colonies) that certain
10 Another commonly recurring question is whether the right guaranteed is a "collective"
or an "individual" one-i.e., does it reside only in the people as a whole, or in individual
citizens? Aside from the metaphysical difficulty of how something can exist in a whole with-
out existing in any of its parts, it is submitted that this is really a meaningless distinction-
the better question being couched in terms of the purposes for which arms may be kept and
borne. Do those constitutionally protected purposes include, for example, personal self-
defense or recreation? If so, then the right can easily be said to extend to bona fide hunters,
or to those reasonably fearing for their safety, so long as they are keeping or bearing arms
for those purposes. If, on the other hand, the only keeping and bearing encompassed by the
amendment is that which has the collective security of the people as its purpose, then the
keeping and bearing may properly be limited to those individuals exercising that function.
n Madison's original form of the amendment read:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person.
2 WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1408 (1910). There was then "consider-
able debate on the subject in the House of Representatives" and the "Committee of Three
reported the article substantially as it had been reported by the Committee of Eleven, but
it was subsequently changed by Congress to read as now found in the Constitution." Ibid.
The earlier version of Madison's bolsters the generally held view that the amendment was
part and parcel of an attempt to eliminate standing armies by maintaining the militia, and
that accordingly it should be construed in that context.
II DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 321-24 (1894).
a See, for general discussion of the background of the first ten amendments, RUTLAND, THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791 (1955); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES (Perry & Cooper, eds. 1959); Feller & Gotting, stupra note 5, at 56-62.
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rights were fundamental to a free society, and should be "guaranteed" against
governmental intrusion.
Even earlier than 1791-after the Declaration of Independence in 1776-
most of the newly-declared states had adopted constitutions of their own. Eight
included a bill of rights, and four of these (Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
Vermont, and Massachusetts) cited a specific "Right to bear arms.' 14 As might
be expected, it was from these states that the loudest call for a federal bill
originated. The first such state bill was Virginia's, drafted almost exclusively
by George Mason; it is therefore noteworthy that Mason's document posited:
That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that standing armies,
in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases,
the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil
power.lS
No specific "right to bear arms" is included, yet the concept seems latent in
the language of the provision. It has been said that "George Mason's document
had a profound and pervasive influence"' 6 on the other states, and that Mason
may have been the "ghost" for Madison's version of a federal Bill of Rights.'
7
But from what source did these colonial draftsmen derive their "bills"-
especially the right to bear arms therein? It would indeed have been remark-
able had the first ten amendments embodied concepts spontaneously recog-
nized by our forefathers. Rather, it would seem their philosophic and political
conviction as to the existence of certain basic rights had its pragmatic founda-
tion in their own revolution and in the oppressions which led to it. Notable
among the devices of George III to compel colonial subservience was the main-
tenance of a large British army in the colonies, and the use of that army to
enforce laws themselves oppressive.' 8 Any school child knows, for example,
that the spark igniting the Revolutionary War was the attempt by the British
to seize the supply of militia arms and weapons cached at Lexington and Con-
cord. It is ultimately extremely clear that the constitution's draftsmen would
", The whole process of adoption of bills of rights in the colonies is traced in RUTLAND, op.
cit. supra note 13, at 13-77. See also, Feller & Gotting, supra note 5, at 53-56; and Attorney
General Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach's "Memorandum Re Federal Firearms Control and the
Second Amendment," contained in 1965 Dodd Hearings, supra note 1, at 41, 46-48.
"1 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, op. cit. supra note 13, at 312.
"1 Feller & Gotting, supra note 5, at 53.
"7Pittman, The Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509, 588
(1956).
s The Preamble to the Declaration of Independence cites numerous specific grievances
against King George III, among which were the following:
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our
Legislatures.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.
[Vol. XVI
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not tolerate a standing professional army in the new nation-at least such a
federal standing army as would inhibit and intimidate the states or the people
in the exercise of their respective sovereignties.1 9 The over-riding consider-
ation was to establish by constitutional mandate the status of the militia, the
citizen-army, as the proper custodian of the country's liberty, and to eliminate
the chance of a recurrence of the "colonial grievances," such as the quartering
of troops in private homes, the court-martialing of civilians, and the seizure of
militia arms.
No doubt a valid and vital concern of many individual colonists was per-
sonal protection from wilderness animals, brigands, or marauding Indians.
Especially on the frontiers, the provision of food itself depended largely on
the skill of sharpshooting huntsmen. But there is no persuasive indication that
these considerations influenced Congress or the various state ratifying conven-
tions in adopting the second amendment.
20
It is equally clear that the Second Amendment was not without precedent,
nor was the colonists' fear of standing armies a novel emotion. Indeed it is
ironic that the American colonies, finding themselves beset by foreign military
rule, patterned their constitutional remedy on a similar provision in the con-
stitution of the offending nation. For there is no doubt that the colonists, and
the delegates to the federal convention, were aware that the concept of a Bill
of Rights originated in England in times of persecution, from King John in
the 13th century to the Stuart kings in the 17th.21
19See generally, COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 498-99 (7th ed. 1903); 2 STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 677 (3d ed. 1858); THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 62-79 (Bordon
ed. 1965).
During the federal convention George Mason proposed that article I, section 8, clause 16
of the constitution, authorizing Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining
the Militia," be prefaced by the following: "That the Liberties of the People may be better
secured against the Danger of regular Troops or standing Armies in Time of Peace,..."
IV FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 59 (rev. ed. 1937). The modification
was rejected, and we may suppose mainly for reasons of style: the proposal embodies a "prin-
ciple" or "policy" which is out of place in the enumeration of specific powers of Congress,
but which would be perfectly appropriate in a bill of rights such as Mason had drafted in
Virginia. Cf. Feller & Gotting, supra note 5, at 57.
' Feller & Gotting, supra note 5, at 58-59, note however that amendments apparently to
this effect were introduced in the Massachusetts and New Hampshire ratifying conventions.
21 Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Convention of 1788, cited the English experience as a rea-
son for a Bill of Rights in the federal constitution. III ELLIoTr's DEBATES 316 (2d ed. 1836);
Alexander Hamilton, in the FEDERALIST No. 84, Concerning Several Miscellaneous Objections,
argues against the need for a bill of rights since such are peculiarly "stipulations between
kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favour of privilege, reservations of
rights not surrendered to the prince." The delegates also may have been aware of Blackstone's
admonition regarding standing armies:
In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession
of arms.... In [free states] no man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his
country and its laws: he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is be-
cause he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he makes himself for a while
soldier.
1966]
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The specific progenitor of the second amendment's right to bear arms is
generally conceded to be the provision in the English Declaration of Rights
of 1688, that "The subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their
defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law."'22 After the
Restoration of the Stuart Kings in 1660, the Catholic James II succeeded his
brother Charles II in 1685. Whether out of a politically-expedient sense of
religious toleration or a genuine Catholic apostolate (it is not certain which),
James II initiated a series of prerogative measures, 23 involving both the "dis-
pensing" and "suspending" of the laws of the realm, including the appoint-
ment of fellow Catholics to positions in the military, and the maintenance of
a large private guard which has been described as "the largest concentration
of trained full-time troops that England had ever seen. '2 4 In near revolt,
Parliament, in 1688, drafted a declaration which embodied its understanding
of the proper relationship between the Crown, Parliament, and the people,
and, with James II in flight, agreed to the accession of William of Orange to
the throne of England if he would accept the conditions of the Declaration.2 5
The Declaration (subsequently "Bill") of Rights addressed itself to all the
grievances prevailing at the time, and so in that sense is similar to our own
Declaration of Independence and Constitution. And those grievances were
felt so fundamental that the remedies demanded were, even at the time, recog-
nized as basic rights, 26 and included the right to petition for redress and a pro-
I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0408; and Blackstone's categorization of the right to keep arms
as an "auxiliary right" of every English subject. Id. at 0143-44.
1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2 (1689), set out in full in III CHITTY'S ENGLISH STATUTES 659 (6th ed.
1912): "An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession
of the Crown."
0 In defiance of an Act of Charles II's reign, James had, in reliance upon his ecclesiasti-
cal supremacy, erected a new court of High Commission. He had levied customs duties
before they had been regularly granted to him by Parliament. He had prosecuted the
Seven Bishops who had presented a respectful petition. He had allowed Papists to be
officers in his army, and refused Protestants the right to carry arms.
6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 241 (1927).
2 CHURCHILL, The New World, 2 HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 409 (1962).
23 The full scope of the Revolution settlement in England in 1688 is too broad to be dis-
cussed fully here. See generally: II TAYLOR, ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTI-
TUTION 409-51 (1898); 6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 240-41 (1927); LOVELL, ENG-
LISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 361-414 (1962); KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 446-50 (1942).
91 The preamble to the Declaration asserted that it contained the "true, ancient, and in-
dubitable rights of the people of this realm."
The Declaration of Rights thus put forth was a summing up in a dogmatic form of
that code of positive law regulating the prerogatives of the crown, the privileges of par-
liament, and the liberty of the subject now generally known as the "Law of the Consti-
tution," as distinguished from that body of political maxims, of silent understandings,
undefined either by common or statute law, which have been invented since the be-
ginning of the reign of William III, as the most convenient means of regulating the
changed relations of the two houses to each other and of the crown to both, necessarily
[Vol. XVI
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hibition against standing armies. On February 13, 1689, William, speaking
in his own name and in that of his wife Mary, announced, "We thankfully
accept what you have offered us," thereby declaring their willingness to reign
on Parliament's terms.2
7
What is noteworthy in the English Bill of Rights is of course the specific
provision allowing Protestants to bear arms, but this must be appreciated in
its historical setting. Parliament did not appear to be claiming for the people
a right of individual self-defense or self-effacement, but rather the general
right, as a populace, to remain armed in the face of possible military imposi-
tions.28 The resulting guarantee that Protestants might have arms for their
defense necessarily related to the political grievances against King James
which resulted in the Act of Settlement requiring the King to be a member
of the Church of England. More specifically, the grievance underlying the
guarantee was that Protestants had been deprived of weapons "at the same
time when Papists were ... armed."29 The imposition lay more in the dis-
crimination than in the disarming.3
0
Thus, that same element of pragmatic necessity was involved in the formu-
lation of the English Bill of Rights as was present in our own. Since this was
the earliest appearance of an express right to bear arms, it might then be
argued that the right, as a constitutional principle, has no roots deeper than
1688, or even 1791. Yet the language of the second amendment and most of the
state equivalents presumes the existence of some identifiable right to bear
arms, and merely guarantees that right. And, no matter how convincing is
made the argument that the second amendment took its form and existence
from the circumstances of the American Revolution or the earlier English
upheaval, the amendment seems to have been intended to embody a principle
fundamental to human society and hence a principle with roots deeper than
the exigencies of the day. If this is true, then it appears inappropriate to seek
the full definition of the "right to keep and bear arms" in the circumstances
resulting from the transfer through the Revolution of the sovereignty of the state from
the crown to the legislature.
II TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 25, at 415.
II TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 25, at 415.
Feller & Gotting, supra note 5, at 48-49. But: "One able European scholar firmly main-
tained that this right, and the right of petition, were the only 'individual rights' in the English
Bill of Rights." RUTLAND, op. cit. supra note 13, at 9 n.12, citing JELLINEK, THE DECLARATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CrrIzENs 49 (Farrand trans. 1901). A similar view with respect
to the second amendment is expressed in BIsHOP, STATUTORY CRIMES 536 (3d ed. 1901).
I W. & M., sess. 2. c. 2 (1689) (Preamble). See III CHrrrY's ENGLISH STATUTES 659 (6th ed.
1912).
" This thought is suggested-almost accidentally-in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, SOURCES
OF OUR LMERTIES 231 (Perry & Cooper eds. 1959): "The discrimination against the right of
Protestants to bear arms led to the seventh clause in the list of rights in the [English] Bill
of Rights."
1966]
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of Revolutionary America, or of Jamesian England, or in a combination of
the similar characteristics of the two crises.
Yet since a specific "right to bear arms" has not manifested itself in other
constitutional schemes,31 it seems a peculiarly Anglo-American phenomenon
premised on a longstanding mistrust of standing armies 32 and a concomitant
reliance on the armed citizen-soldier.33 Nowhere is there any respectable au-
thority for the proposition that, as of 1791, the Constitution's guaranty of the
right to bear arms extended generally to personal self-defense as that con-
cept was applied in the common law. The right guaranteed was that of the
populace to respond in kind to political oppressions vi et armis.
A possible explanation for the popular sentiment that the right was a
long-standing one is the fact that one of the incidents of the feudal system in
England was the obligation of the people generally to respond to a "call to
arms" to put down insurrection or to quell a public disturbance. In such a
situation, there was a clearly recognized duty to keep and bear arms,34 which
had long been ingrained in the political and social structure of the country.
Similarly, the first Congress enacted legislation requiring militiamen to main-
tain a store of weapons and ammunition in case of need.35 These "duties" im-
plied no corresponding "right" on their face, but it seems a fair conclusion
that they may have been so understood by the citizens of the day: if they
were required to keep arms to help assure public tranquility, did they not
have a right to that tranquility, and hence a right to the weapons needed to
assure it? Even if this inference is allowed, it does not expand the "right"
beyond the purpose of collective security in its broadest sense.
We are led, then, to the threshold of the conclusion that the "right to keep
and bear arms", as it is guaranteed in the American and British constitutions,
is a political right of the populace generally to maintain a state of military
preparedness against the possibility of domestic or foreign military imposi-
tions. The only obstacle to crossing the threshold and embracing this con-
clusion is the faint echo and uncertain language of courts, commentators, and
81 For example, the French Revolution's "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen," of August 26, 1789, affirms a right of "resistance to oppression" but contains no
explicit reference to arms-bearing. II CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 21 (Peaslee ed. 1956). Nor
does the United Nations Charter specifically acknowledge such a right.
82 Popular mistrust of standing armies-especially mercenaries-has been traced at least as
far back as the Magna Charta in 1215. Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A.J. 554, 555
(1965).
13 Blackstone notes that King Alfred established a national militia in the 9th century.
I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *409.
a Originating in the Assize of Arms in 1181 [27 Hen. II], and continued in the Statute of
Winchester [13 Edw. I, c. 6 (1285)]. Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410-11. And compare
the language of the Statute of Northampton of 1328 (infra, text at note 39) which allowed
arms-bearing "upon a cry made for arms to keep the peace."
a5 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
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legislatures, suggesting that the "right" long antedates any constitutional rec-
ognition of it, and includes purposes broader than collective security.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS REGULATION
If there is no evidence that a "right to keep and bear arms" had achieved
any constitutional status prior to 1688, the correlative legislative and judicial
power to regulate weapons had been long ago established. Blackstone, writing
in the 1750's, could cite only an ancient law of Solon to the effect that every
Athenian who walked about the city in armor was subject to a fine; 36 yet there
appear to have been early weapons regulations in England as well. In pre-
Norman times, Hlothhere and Eadric, Kings of Kent in the 7th century,
ordained that:
If, where men are drinking, a man draws his weapon, but no harm is done there,
he shall pay a shilling to him who owns the house and twelve shillings to the
king.
3 7
Similarly, Alfred the Great, reigning at the end of the 9th century, established
fines and penalties for "anyone [who] fights, or draws his weapon" in the
king's halls, in the presence of an archbishop, at public meetings, or in the
"house of a commoner."
38
Then, in 1328, during the reign of Edward III, Parliament enacted the
Statute of Northampton 39 which provided:
1. No man great or small, of what condition soever he be, except the king's
servants in his presence, and his ministers in executing of the king's precepts, or
of their office, and such as be in their company assisting them, and also upon a
cry made for arms to keep the peace, and the same in such places where such acts
happen, be so hardy to come before the king's justices, or other of the king's
ministers doing their office, with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of
the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in
the presence of the justices or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere, upon
pain to forfeit their armour to the king, and their bodies to prison at the king's
pleasure. [Emphasis added].
Thus was established the statutory misdemeanor of "going about armed" as
it is frequently called. 40 The few English cases which have applied the law
m 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149.
87 ATTENBOROUGH, THE LAws OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 21 (1922).
Is Id. at 69, 73, 81-82.
2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328). Set out in IV CHrrrY's ENGLISH STATUTES 936 (6th ed. 1911), and
in I STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (1963).
10 10 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 583 (3d ed. 1955); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 365 (1957);
I BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw 329 (5th ed. 1872); Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REv. 473 (1915).
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indicate further that the restriction it imposed was not new, but that the
proscribed conduct was, even without the statute, a common law crime.
41
These limitations, however, only marginally inhibited a person's right to
own or possess weapons. They were really restrictions on the manner of bear-
ing the arms, and not their "keeping." A note appended to Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, however, suggests that: "Whoever examines the forest and game
laws in the British code will readily perceive that the right of keeping arms
is effectually taken away from the people of England." 42 And Blackstone him-
self admits "that the prevention of popular insurrections and resistance to
government by disarming the bulk of the people... is a reason oftener meant
than avowed by the makers of the forest and game laws. '"4 3 One such statute
provided that no person other than heirs of nobility, who did not own lands
with a yearly value of £100, should be allowed even to keep a gun.44 Reading
this proscription together with the Statute of Northampton, one writer has
concluded that "a right to keep and bear arms was not regarded as a funda-
mental right of every Englishman." 45 Whether so regarded or not, the eminent
Joseph Story noted in 1833 that the English "right to bear arms" was "more
nominal than real, as a defensive privilege."
46
In this country, the colonies by and large applied the English criminal
law,47 and of course it is well known that most states, by statute or otherwise,
specifically adopted the common law of England as their guiding rules of law.
Thus, the common law crime of "going about armed" was recognized in the
United States in a few early cases.48 If it can properly be said that the drafts-
men of the American Bill of Rights were cognizant of the English experience
in that regard, it seems an equally permissible inference that those draftsmen
were also aware of the longstanding limitations on the free ownership or use
of firearms in England.49 It might also be noted that, despite the mandate of
41Sir John Knight's Case, 3 Mod. Rep. 117, 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B. 1686); R. v. Dewhurst,
1 State Tr. N.S. 529 (1820); R. v. Meade, 19 T.L.R. 540 (1903).
42 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0144 n.23 (Tucker) (Sharswood ed. 1859).
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "412.
"22 Car. II, ch. 25, sec. 3 (1670).
"Emery, supra note 40, at 474.
" 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 678 (3d ed. 1858).
47 Cf. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 176-77 (1930).
4State v. Huntly, 3 Ired. 418 (N.C. 1843); State v. Roten, 86 N.C. 701 (1882); State v.
Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N.E. 572 (1900) (dictum). But see Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn.
(15 Yerg.) 356 (1833), denying that the Statute of Northampton was adopted as part of the
state's common law since it was particularly aimed at the gentry of 1328.
,0 Consider this dictum of the Supreme Court:
The law is perfectly well-settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution,
commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel prin-
ciples of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we
had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been
subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In
incorporating these principles into the fundamental law there was no intention of dis-
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the English Bill of Rights, that country has enacted, through the Gun License
Act of 1870,50 the Pistols Act of 1903,51 and the Firearms Act of 1937,52 much
more stringent regulations on firearms than any in existence here.
Thus, to whatever extent we look to the English experience for the source
of our "right to keep and bear arms" as a constitutional principle, we must
also see that that same people had long established a measure of control on
the "right" to weapons. Nor, on reflection, does this seem more than ordinary,
for the very nature of ordered government includes something of a "police
power" to regulate and prohibit activities inconsistent with public peace.
From all this, a conclusion may be suggested, which, even if it is eroded
below, may nonetheless serve as a valuable point of reference: i.e., the first
"right to bear arms" to achieve constitutional recognition 53 was penned in an
age, and by men, well-knowing that there were inherent limitations on such
a right-limitations properly derived from the essential police power of their
government, and limitations which had, and could have, no relation to the
political oppressions which engendered the declaration of the right. The right
to bear arms, therefore, was established as a "fundamental principle" by na-
tions well aware of the parallel principle of police power-i.e., the protection
of the public health, safety, and welfare.
III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1791
As of the date of the adoption of the second amendment, its language tied
the "right to keep and bear arms" to the necessity for maintaining a "well-
regulated militia." The "right" was vested in the "people." The right related
to "arms." Each of these aspects has been the subject of judicial scrutiny since
1791, either by direct challenges to legislation as violative of the second
amendment, or by challenges under parallel state constitutional provisions, or
infrequently on "due process" or "privileges and immunities" grounds under
the fourteenth amendment.
A. Limitations on Federal Action:
The second amendment to the federal constitution applies ipso facto to federal
action, particularly legislation. Until the 1930's, there was no federal legisla-
regarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally
expressed. Thus.... the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is not infringed
by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons; ....
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (Emphasis added).
10 33 & 34 Vict., c. 57 (1870).
3  Edw. VII, c. 18 (1903).
r I Edw. VIII & 1 Geo. VI, c. 12 (1937).
5 The word "recognition" is used out of deference to the view that the right to keep and
bear arms, whatever its essential limitations, antedates both the English and American Bills
of Rights, and hence was "recognized" by their draftsmen.
1966]
Catholic University Law Review
tion dealing with firearms controls, 54 but during that "gangster" era, two
statutes were enacted which provided the first opportunity to raise a direct
second amendment challenge.
The Federal Firearms Act,5 5 enacted in 1938 as an exercise of Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce, prohibits the interstate shipment or
receipt of firearms to or by felons or fugitives from justice, prohibits the ship-
ment of stolen firearms, and requires manufacturers and dealers to procure
licenses for the regular shipment of firearms. The 1934 National Firearms
Act,56 on the other hand, is actually part of the Internal Revenue Code, and
imposes a tax on importers, manufacturers, and dealers, and on "transferors,"
of sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and similar weapons, requires the regis-
tration of such weapons, and prohibits generally the obliteration of identifi-
cation marks, and unauthorized importation of such firearms.
The constitutionality of the latter statute under the second amendment
was affirmed in United States v. Adams,57 by a federal district court which
noted simply that
The second amendment.., has no application to this act. The Constitution
does not grant the privilege to racketeers and desperadoes to carry weapons of the
character dealt with in the act. It refers to the militia, a protective force of govern-
ment; to the collective body and not individual rights.58
Not until 1939 did a direct second amendment case reach the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Miller,5 9 defendant was charged with shipping an unregis-
tered "double-barrel 12-guage Stevens shotgun having a barrel less than 18
inches in length." A judgment sustaining a demurrer to the indictment was
reversed in an opinion by Justice McReynolds which held that the second
amendment must be interpreted in light of its "obvious purpose" of assuring
the continued effectiveness of the militia. Thus, said the Court
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
"shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
" The delay in federal action may at least partially be attributed to uncertainty as to the
authority for congressional action. The federal legislature, being one of enumerated powers,
enjoys no general "police power"--the authority to legislate solely out of concern for public
safety or welfare. This power is vested in the states. Congress, then, must justify its acts on
one or more of its "enumerated powers," which of course include the taxing power and
plenary authority over interstate commerce. Cf. Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regulation, 1 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 400 (1934).
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-09, 52 Stat. 1252 (1938).
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 5801-62.
1711 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1935).
UId. at 218-19.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could con-
tribute to the common defense.6 0
This of course was decision on the narrowest grounds-a failure of proof. It
is significant, however, that the "burden" of proof of such a "reasonable re-
lationship" between the regulated weapon and the militia was cast upon the
accused. This seems to accord with generally accepted principles of statutory
construction in which legislation is presumptively valid until its infirmity
can be clearly demonstrated.
Three years later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found fault with the
test applied in Miller and restricted that holding to its facts. Cases v. United
States6 1 involved a prosecution under the Federal Firearms Act; in it the
court noted that "Commando Units" in the second World War had demon-
strated the utility of almost any kind of weapon, and therefore a test of
"reasonable relationship" was inadequate. The Cases court preferred that
each second amendment challenge "be decided on its own facts and the line
between what is and what is not a valid federal restriction pricked out by
decided cases falling on one side or the other of the line." 62 Then, finding
that the defendant had obtained the gun and "shot up" a nightclub and an
acquaintance of his, the court found "no possible inference" that defendant
was advancing his military training or that his weapon was used for military
purposes
6 3
As a result of these few federal cases,6 4 we have only a clear manifestation
that the second amendment guaranty of a right to bear arms relates intimately
and essentially to military preparedness. The federal courts have not discussed
the nature of the right guaranteed, nor have they suggested that such a right
is obsolete or even obsolescent. Yet the federal courts have sustained the
validity of firearms legislation under both the commerce and tax powers; it
may therefore be supposed that in any future challenge to federal legislation,
the courts will at least seek an accommodation between constitutionally-sanc-
tioned legislative purposes and the constitutionally-protected "right to keep
and bear arms."
00 Id. at 178.
131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied sub nom., Velazquez v. United States, 319 U.S.
770 (1943).
MId. at 922.
61 The Cases court has been criticized as falling into the same error as the Supreme Court
in Miller, by adopting too shallow a rationale. Feller & Gotting, The Second Amendment: A
Second Look, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 46, 66 (1966).
" Mention could also be made of United States v. Fleish, 90 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Mich. 1949),
which again upheld the National Firearms Act against a contention that it invaded the do-
main of state legislation, citing and quoting United States v. Miller, supra note 59.
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B. Limitations on State Action:
Implicit in the last section lurks the question whether the second amendment
to the Federal constitution acts as a restriction on state legislation by applica-
tion through the fourteenth amendment. (This question might have special
pertinence in those states which have no constitutional guaranties in their
own constitutions, and in those states whose constitutional guaranties con-
tain different language from that in the federal Bill of Rights). A simple
answer is "NO," for the equally simple reason that the Supreme Court has
said that the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the second. Whether
the Court would so hold today is questionable, however.
The landmark case is United States v. Cruikshank,5 which was a prosecu-
tion under the Enforcement Act of 187006 on an indictment containing 32
counts of conspiracy to deprive certain Negroes of their civil rights. Two of
the counts alleged an intent to hinder and prevent the exercise of the Negroes'
"right to bear arms." The Court stated, as to those counts:
The second and tenth counts are equally defective. The right there specified is
that of bearing arms for a lawful purpose. This is not a right granted by the Con-
stitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its
existence. The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this,
as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.
This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers
of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against
any violation by their fellow-citizens of the right it recognizes, to what is called...
[the police power].07
This of course was written under the influence of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, s holding generally
that the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states. Despite the modification
of the rule of Barron in recent years, the Cruikshank holding has not specif-
ically been challenged. Indeed, though, it has frequently been re-affirmed in
the state courts,69 the Supreme Court has not had a state-law case before it
since Miller v. Texas70 in 1894.
-92 U.S. 542 (1875). The case was cited and followed in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
265 (1885).
" 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
0192 U.S. at 553.
Is 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 464.
19 Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876); Ex parte Ramirez, 193 Cal. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1924); State
v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 2 S.W. 468 (1886); State v. Keet, 269 Mo. 206, 190 S.W. 573 (1916);
People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 97 N.E. 877 (1912); State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222
(1921); McCollum v. City of Cincinnati, 51 Ohio App. 67, 199 N.E. 603 (1935); Ex parte
Thomas, 21 Okl. 770, 97 Pac. 260 (1908); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 8 Am.
Rep. 8 (1871); Caswell & Smith v. State, 148 S.W. 1159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
153 U.S. 535 (1894), dismissing a second amendment challenge to state regulation on the
authority of Cruikshank and Barron.
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There was, however, speculation and commentary prior to the decision in
Cruikshank to the effect that the second amendment "right to keep and bear
arms" was so basic an institution that it should not be subject to state legisla-
tive action either. Said the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1846:
I am aware that it has been decided, that this, like other amendments adopted
at the same time, is a restriction upon the government of the United States, and
does not extend to the individual states.
. * * *
The language of the second amendment is broad enough to embrace both Fed-
eral and State governments-nor is there anything in its terms which restricts its
meaning. The preamble which was prefixed to these amendments shows, that they
originated in the fear that the powers of the general government were not suffi-
ciently limited. Several of the states, in their act of ratification, recommended
that further restrictive clauses should be added. And in the first session of Con-
gress, ten of these amendments having been agreed to by that body, and after-
wards sactioned by three-fourths of the States, became a part of the Constitution.
But admitting all this, does it follow that because the people refused to delegate
to the general government the power to take from them the right to keep and
bear arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments? Is this a right
reserved to the States or to themselves? Is it not an unalienable right, which lies
at the bottom of every free government? We do not believe that, because the
people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they
ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures. This right is too dear to be
confided to a republican legislature.
... If a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of the State of Georgia
and of the United States, is it competent for the General Assembly to take away
this security by disarming the people? What advantage would it be to tie up the
hands of the national legislature, if it were in the power of the States to destroy
this bulwark of defense.
71
This view seems to coincide closely with the analytical framework currently
used by the Supreme Court in deciding whether specific portions of the Bill
of Rights are applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
7 2
This process of "selective incorporation" would seem to dictate that the
"fundamental-ness" of a right determines its applicability to the States, and
under this test there is much to suggest that the second amendment should be
so construed.73
Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 250-51 (1846).
12 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Justice Cardozo stated the test in Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937): "Does it violate those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions?"
" Cf. Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A.J. 554, 666 (1965).
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In addition, the Supreme Court in Presser v. Illinois,7 4 while otherwise
affirming the rule of Cruikshank, intimated that because of the broad power
of the United States over the militia, and its reliance on the militia as the
source of its armies, "the States cannot, even laying the constitutional pro-
vision in question [the second amendment] out of view, prohibit the people
from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their
rightful resource for maintaining the public security .... "75
This dictum implies that the federal responsibility for military operations
is sufficient in and of itself to preclude state interference with militia readiness.
There are therefore two possible channels through which the second amend-
ment could be found applicable to all the states; (1) the process of absorption
through the fourteenth amendment, or (2) as a result of the Federal supremacy
over, and reliance upon, the state militia. Further, there is nothing in the
language of the second amendment which limits its guaranty to infringement
by legislation. It is therefore likely that, if the second amendment is incor-
porated into the fourteenth, its protection will extend to all state action, be it
judicial, legislative, or executive, under the rationale of Shelley v. Kraemer76
and its progeny.
Several cases have presented other challenges under the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Presser v. Illinois,77 defendant was convicted of organizing a private
military association-the "Lehr und Wehr Verein"-and parading through
the streets of Chicago contrary to Illinois law. In addition to a second amend-
ment contention (which was dismissed on the authority of United States v.
Cruikshank78), defendant urged that the statute deprived him of the "privi-
leges and immunities" of United States citizenship, and of due process of law.
The Supreme Court dismissed the latter argument as "untenable,"7 9 and said
as to the former:
The right voluntarily to associate together as a military company or organiza-
tion, or to drill or parade with arms, without, and independent of, an act of Con-
gress or law of the State authorizing the same, is not an attribute of national
citizenship.0
" 116 U.S. 252 (1885).
7
1 Id. at 265.
76 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948): "State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms."
116 U.S. 252 (1885).
71 Supra, note 65.
7 116 U.S. at 268.
1 id. at 265. The case was one of many raising "privileges and immunities" objections
during that period; the lack of success of those challenges stimulated reliance on "due process"
grounds instead. Cf. III WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HIsTORY 289 (1923).
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Some years later, in Patsone v. Pennsylvania,8 1 Justice Holmes cryptically up-
held a state statute which prohibited aliens from hunting and "to that extent"
possessing rifles or shotguns, on grounds that it did not violate either the equal
protection or due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
However, if no case reaches the Supreme Court upon which it could properly
modify the rule of Cruikshank, or if the Court in a proper case simply de-
clined to apply a federal standard to state action, numerous questions arise
as to the extent to which state action might intrude upon the "right to keep
and bear arms." At least one jurisdiction (in which there is no state consti-
tutional equivalent of the second amendment) has intimated that local weap-
ons-control legislation need not allow for any "right to bear arms." 82 And
since there are some fifteen states without explicit constitutional provisions,
that view could become more widespread.
As a perusal of the various state constitutions set out in the Appendix will
indicate, the "right" guaranteed in many of them is on its face much broader
than that protected by the second amendment. Five states extend the right
to the "home, person, or property" of the citizen; 83 six others recognize that
the right of the citizen is to defend "himself" as well as the state. 84 It is too
simple an answer to say that these states have misconstrued the fundamental
right they seek to guarantee, or that the "right" is obsolete. Such may be the
case, but if legislation is someday to be enacted that would effectively deprive
otherwise competent citizens from possessing guns in their home, or for
purposes of self-protection, constitutional amendments in those states would
almost certainly be prerequisite.
In the meantime any state gun control restrictions would have to be recon-
cilable with existing state constitutional provisions. Where those provisions
encompass (or appear to encompass) purposes broader than militia readiness,
any proposed legislation must be evaluated accordingly. For example, while
it is not suggested that these cases are generally controlling today, several
courts have held gun control statutes unconstitutional in the past: in Nunn
v. State,85 the Georgia court invalidated that portion of a statute which pro-
hibited carrying weapons openly; In re Brickey86 held that the legislature
-'232 U.S. 138 (1914). Same holding as to statute prohibiting possession of firearms by
felons: State v. Robinson, 343 P.2d 886 (Ore. 1959).
Ex parte Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 226 Pac. 914 (1924); People v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App.
466, 231 Pac. 601 (1924).
8 Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma.
" Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, Texas, Washington. Still others use the plural
pronoun "themselves" in conjunction with "State"; Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming. An argument can be made that "them-
selves" is really only a paraphrase for the existing societal system, and not a guaranty for a
right to keep and bear arms for personal defense. Cf. Feller & Gotting, supra note 63, at 55.
811 Ga. 243 (1846).
8 8 Idaho 597, 70 Pac. 609, 101 Am. St. Rep. 215 (1902).
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could not prohibit the mere carrying of weapons by private persons within
city limits; in Andrews v. State,87 the Tennessee court struck down that por-
tion of a deadly weapons statute which proscribed the carrying of "pistols,"
since those weapons could be "arms" in the military sense; and in Jennings v.
State,8 8 where the Texas constitution expressly authorized the legislature to
"regulate the wearing of arms," the court held unconstitutional a provision
calling for the forfeiture of any weapon illegally carried.
C. Relation to Militia Readiness:
It was noted in sections I and II above that, historically, the right to keep
and bear arms in the minds of constitutional draftsmen in England and in
the United States was inextricably bound up in the felt need for a well-regu-
lated militia. The language of the second amendment joins the two ideas, as
does the language of most of the state provisions. There is little doubt that
the federal courts, in construing federal statutes under the second amend-
ment, will recognize a right to bear arms only when there is some demonstrable
tie between militia readiness and the challenged regulation. Yet it has been
seen that certain state constitutions on their face purport to extend the right to
the protection of self and property, and that there is a continuing "echo" to
the effect that the right to bear arms had its origins in the dim recesses of the
common law-long prior to its attaining constitutional stature in 1688 and
1791.
Generally, in cases which have upheld the constitutionality of firearms
controls, a finding of a lack of relationship between the proscribed arms-bear-
ing and the militia has been made in those states whose constitutions suggest
that the purpose of the right is only for collective security, while those states
whose constitutions seem to extend the "right" to personal protection either
have not litigated the question at all or have avoided an outright confronta-
tion with this issue. Only one case-and that a very old one-has held that
the right to bear arms is absolute. In Bliss v. Commonwealth s9 the Kentucky
court invalidated a concealed weapons statute holding that the right to bear
arms must be preserved "entire." The constitution in that state was subse-
quently modified to permit regulation, and the case itself has been considered
something of an outrageous phenomenon.90
Sometimes the question posed is whether "individuals" enjoy the right.
8750 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8 (1871).
115 Tex. App. 298 (1878).
102 Litt. 90, 13 Am. Dec. 251 (Ky. 1822).
0 It was criticized in State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842), and in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn.
(2 Humph.) 154 (1840). In State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 (1891), the court found the
holding in Bliss not so surprising in a state which could also rule, in Carico v. Commonwealth,
70 Ky. (7 Bush) 124 (1870), that a person in honest fear of his life was entitled to bushwack
his enemyl
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Thus, in City of Salina v. Blaksley,91 the court upheld a statute prohibiting
the carrying of pistols, on the grounds that
The provision in section 4 of the Bill of Rights "that the people have the right
to bear arms for their defense and security" refers to the people as a collective
body. It was the safety and security of society that was being considered when this
provision was put into our constitution.92
Similarly, a somewhat cynical Florida court sustained the constitutionality of
a concealed weapons statute in these words:
This section was intended to give the people the means of protecting themselves
against oppression and public outrage, and was not designed as a shield for the
individual man, who is prone to load his stomach with liquor and his pockets with
dynamite, and make of himself a dangerous nuisance to society.
93
At other times the question posed is: "What 'arms' are protected by the
constitution?" Answered a frontier Texas court:
... Certainly such as are useful and proper to an armed militia. The deadly
weapons spoken of in the statute are pistols, dirks, daggers, slungshots, sword-
canes, spears, brass-knuckles and bowie knives. Can it be understood that these
were contemplated by the framers of our bill of rights? Most of them are the
wicked devices of modern craft.
To refer the deadly devices and instruments called in the statute "deadly weap-
ons" to the proper or necessary arms of a "well-regulated militia," is simply ridic-
ulous. No kind of travesty, however subtle or ingenious, could so misconstrue this
provision of the constitution of the United States, as to make it cover and protect
that pernicious vice, from which so many murders, assassinations, and deadly as-
saults have sprung, and which it was doubtless the intention of the legislature to
punish and prohibit.
94
By this rationale, a Tennessee court found a similar statute valid except as to
pistols which could be appropriate military weapons. 95 Later the same court
struck down a municipal ordinance prohibiting altogether the carrying of a
pistol. 96 In the same vein, a Vermont "concealed weapons" ordinance was
72 Kan. 230, 83 Pac. 619 (1905).
MId. at 231, 83 Pac. at 620.
Carlton v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 9, 58 So. 486, 488 (1912).
English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 474, 476 (1872). To same effect, see: Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472,
474-75 (1874); Pierce v. State, 275 Pac. 393, 395 (Okla. 1929). See also AM. & ENG. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAw 718 (Merrill ed. 1887).
5 Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 8 Am. Rep. 8 (1871). The statute was amended
to exclude army pistols and was sustained in that form in State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. (7 Bax.)
57 (1872).
"Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga, 157 Tenn. 518, 11 S.W. 2d 678 (1928).
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found unconstitutional as it pertained to handguns; 97 but a Texas statute
prohibiting machine guns was upheld.9 s Obviously weaponry has changed
since the federal, and most state, "right to bear arms" provisions were enacted.
Although there has been little recent litigation on the subject, one court,
which felt constrained by the language of the state constitution to strike down
a pistol-licensing statute, admitted that the right to bear arms did not mean
that "the people have the futile right to use submarines and cannon of 100
mile range nor airplanes dropping deadly bombs, nor the use of poisonous
gases,..." 9 9
The whole problem of attempting to ascertain the inter-workings of the
right to bear arms and the maintenance of the militia has been considered
moot by some writers,100 for the reason that the "militia" as our forefathers
knew it, and relied upon it, has disappeared. 1° 1 Indeed, despite the long-stand-
ing dread of standing armies cited as the basic impetus for the enactment of
"right to bear arms" provisions in the English and American constitutions,
a standing army has become accepted as the only effective and efficient way
of assuring our national security. The role of the citizen-soldier, and of his
independent state militia outfit, has diminished almost to nothingness-if for
no other reason than that the federal government has assumed total responsi-
bility for training and supplying the "militia" (the National Guard). 0 2 It
would clearly be impossible for any individual, or even any state, to hope to
maintain an arsenal of the sophisticated weapons in use today.
One hundred and thirty years ago Joseph Story lamented that "among the
American people, there is a growing indifference to any system of militia disci-
pline, and a strong disposition from a sense of its burdens, to be rid of all
regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed, without
some organization it is difficult to see." 103 Story's fears notwithstanding, the
people of the United States have come to accept that their greatest security lies
in a prepared standing army, buttressed by a "militia" of federally trained,
equipped and disciplined National Guardsmen, none of whom is called upon,
or expected to supply his own weapons. The call for an armed citizenry seems
confined to reactionary political groups-and to a number of dissenting
judges. 0 4
17 State v. Rosenthal, 75 Vt. 295, 55 Atl. 610 (1903).
91 Morrison v. State, 339 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
9 State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 577, 107 S.E. 222, 224-25 (1921).
100 E.g., Feller & Gotting, supra note 63, at 67-70.
11 Cf. Rosengren, The Myth of the Militia, 60 W. VA. B.A.J. 65 (1944).
1o See, inter alia, 32 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501, 502, 701 (1956).
10 II STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 677 (3d ed. 1858).
101 See, e.g., Mathews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958) (dissent of Emmert, C.J.); Moore
v. Gallup, 267 App. Div. 64, 45 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1943) (dissent of Hill, P.J.); State v. Nieto, 101
Ohio St. 409, 130 N.E. 663 (1920) (dissent of Wanamaker, J.); Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1,
72 S.E. 260 (1911) (dissent of Atkinson, J.).
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It is in this sense that the second amendment can be called obsolete' 05-the
militia itself, in the form it took in colonial days, is obsolete. Continued in-
sistence on an interconnection between arms-bearing and militia preparedness
can only lead to ridiculous legal dialogues. For example, a federal statute de-
fines the militia of the United States as "all able-bodied males at least 17
years of age and ... under 45 years of age ... and ... female citizens of the
United States who are commissioned officers of the National Guard."' 10 6 Does
it therefore follow that most young and old males, and almost all females,
have no right to keep and bear arms? Or that every potential draftee is en-
titled to acquire and carry military-issue carbines, automatic rifles, and side-
arms?
The alternative to such semanticism (in those states whose constitutions
permit the interpretation) is an acknowledgement that the right to bear arms
exists for purposes other than national security, such as the protection of one's
person or property.'0 7 The test of validity of gun-control legislation should
then be its reasonableness as a police regulation considering any inhibiting
effects on genuine self-protection.
D. Permissible Areas of Regulation:
As was noted on the first page of this article, firearms control statutes have
almost universally been adjudged constitutional when challenged on "right
to bear arms" grounds. The few cases which have found such legislation in-
valid have for the most part been adverted to above. It may, however, be valu-
able to review briefly the specific forms of gun control which have been liti-
gated.
Two caveats are first necessary: (1) each of the cited cases which follows
must be evaluated in light of the specific language of the applicable state
constitution since some evidence a broader right than others; and (2) each
item of legislation which survives the "right to bear arms" test must also
pass muster as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The earliest type of gun legislation was directed at the carrying of con-
cealed weapons. Most of the cases construing such statutes were therefore
cases of first impression in the jurisdiction, and so contain the most lucid
discussion of the constitutional issues, and also serve as the controlling prece-
dent for challenges to subsequent legislation. With the exception of Bliss v.
10 Cf. Feller & Gotting, supra note 63, at 70.
' 10 U.S.C. §311 (1964).
'0 The idyllic suggestion has even been made that the Supreme Court, "in view of the kinds
of arms which now exist, [could] convert the Second Amendment into an absolute right to
bear arms, unhampered by any concept of arms for militia use only." Sprecher, The Lost
Amendment, 51 A.B.A.J. 554, 666 (1965).
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Commonwealth, discussed above,108 every court which has passed on a con-
cealed weapons statute has found it constitutional.100
From these holding it was but a short step to upholding statutes which
forbade the carrying of weapons in public places, 110 or on the property of
another,"' or while in prison. 1 2 Statutes requiring licenses to carry a firearm
have also generally been sustained,"13 including the notorius Sullivan Act in
New York which requires a permit for the mere possession of handguns."
4
Interestingly, when the Sullivan Act was amended in 1931 to require finger-
printing and photographing of applicants, a lower court" 5 found the amend-
ments unconstitutional as an unreasonable exercise of the police power, but,
though the result was affirmed on appeal,118 that constitutional basis for it
was quite clearly reversed.
As in Blackstone's day," 7 the hunting and game laws often impose restric-
tions on arms-bearing. But where such a statute prohibits possession of guns
by aliens, at least one state has held the statute unconstitutional on the grounds
that the right to bear arms is an "individual" one (thus intimating that it
includes personal self-defense within its purview);"18 another state has found
such a limitation a valid police regulation. 1 9 In a Michigan case, however,
where the defendant and four other "unnaturalized foreigners" were arrested
while sitting in a Marmon touring car in Detroit and all of them were armed,
the court cited the specific language of the state constitution-"Every person
has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state"-
108 Supra, note 89.
100 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 35 Am. Dec. 44 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Carlton
v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 58 So. 486 (1912); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); People v. Liss, 406 III.
419, 94 N.E.2d 320 (1950); State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); McIntire v. State, 170
Ind. 163, 83 N.E. 1005 (1908); State v. Jumel, 13 La. An. 399 (1858); State v. Shelby, 90 Mo.
302, 2 S.W. 468 (1886); State v. Keet, 269 Mo. 206, 190 S.W. 573 (1916); State v. Angelo, 130
At. 458 (N.J. 1925); State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697 (1882); Porello v. State, 121 Ohio St. 280,
168 N.E. 135 (1929); State v. Nieto, 101 Ohio St. 409, 130 N.E. 663 (1920); Mathews v. State,
33 Okla. Cr. 347, 244 Pac. 56 (1926); Ex parte Thomas, 21 Okla. 770, 97 Pac. 260 (1908); Wright
v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. St. 470 (1875); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154 (1840);
English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872); State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 (1891).
110 Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874); State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881).
" Isaiah v. State, 176 Ala. 27, 58 So. 53 (1911).
12 People v. Wells, 156 P.2d 979 (Calif. 1945).
18 Davis v. State, 146 So. 2d 892 (1962); Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1, 72 S.E. 260 (1911);
Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1958).
"I People v. Ryan, 136 N.Y.S. 154 (Munic. Ct. 1911); People ex rel. Darling v. Warden of
City Prison, 154 App. Div. 413, 139 N.Y.S. 277 (1913); People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 97 N.E.
877 (1912).
People ex rel. Ferris v. Horton, 147 Misc. 506, 264 N.Y.S. 84 (1933).
10 Id. 239 App. Div. 610, 269 N.Y.S. 579 (1934). It may here be noted that though the New
State Constitution does not mention a right to bear arms, the New York Civil Rights Law,
art. 2, § 4, does include such a provision, in the same language as the second amendment.
17 See supra, notes 42-43.
People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936).
State v. Rheaume, 80 N.H. 319, 116 Ad. 758 (1922). Cf. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
138 (1914).
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and ruled that the defendant was entitled to carry a weapon for his personal
defense.
120
The organization of private military organizations is prohibited in many
states, and several state constitutions expressly allow for their regulation.
When such legislation is challenged it has been found constitutional. 121 A
poignant example for lawyers may be found in Application of Cassidy,122
where a disciple of Father Coughlin, a member of the Christian Front who
advocated the overthrow of the government, was denied admission to the
Bar of the State of New York because he had been organizing private armed
units during the war. The applicant expressed "jubilation that there is the
Second Amendment," but the Court found no justification for the organiza-
tion of such an armed force.
Statutes prohibiting the ownership or possession of firearms by felons have
also been upheld, 23 as was an Ohio "Tramp Law" under which a defendant
was charged with threatening others with a gun.124 And of course such pro-
scriptions as pointing firearms at another,1 25 discharging them within city
limits, 126 and hunting on Sunday127 are deemed constitutional. A Texas
statute calling for the forfeiture of one's hunting license for hunting on pri-
vate property was also held not to deny the individual his right to keep and
bear arms.
128
The courts have had equally little difficulty with the constitutionality of
legislation affecting the distribution of firearms. A tax on the receipts of pistol
sales was upheld in Texas, 129 a requested injunction against the enforcement
of a sellers' licensing ordinance was denied in Illinois,'1 0 and an old Arkansas
court sustained a statute which made it a misdemeanor to sell any pistol but
those used in the Army or Navy'- 1-in all these cases the "right to bear arms"
challenge was dismissed in scarcely a sentence.
There is little consistency in the cases which have found gun control statutes
(or parts thereof) invalid. Rarely in those cases was the "right to bear arms"
" People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927 (1922).
m State v. Gohl, 46 Wash. 408, 90 Pac. 259 (1907); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 166 Mass.
171, 44 N.E. 138 (1896). Cf. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1885).
12268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944), aff'd 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947).
mJackson v. State, 68 So. 2d 850 (Ala. 1953); People v. Garcia, 218 P.2d 837 (Calif. 1950);
People v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 231 Pac. 601 (1924); City of Akron v. Williams, 177
N.E.2d 802 (Ohio, 1960); State v. Robinson, 343 P.2d 886 (Ore. 1959); State v. Tully, 198
Wash. 605, 89 P.2d 517 (1939).
I"State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio St. 202, 58 N.E. 572 (1900).
1 Davenport v. State, 112 Ala. 49, 20 So. 971 (1896).
12 State v. Johnson, 76 S.C. 39, 56 S.E. 544 (1907); McCollum v. City of Cincinnati, 51 Ohio
App. 67, 199 N.E. 603 (1935).
17Walter v. State, 35 Ohio C.C.R. 567 (1905).
Mowels v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 135, 211 S.W.2d 213 (1948).
'"Caswell & Smith v. State, 148 S.W. 1159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
°Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917).
Dabbs v. State, 39 Ark. 353, 43 Am. Rep. 275 (1882).
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question the central one, and, in keeping with the judicial function, the
courts usually adopted the narrowest ground available. For example, in State
v. Kerner,132 the court felt that a statute requiring a license and a $500 bond
to carry a weapon was invalid only as it applied to pistols since they had a
military use. In Fife v. State,183 the Arkansas court upheld a statute which re-
stricted the carrying of "any pistol of any kind whatever"; two years later, in
Wilson v. State, 34 the same court found another part of the same statute un-
constitutionally narrow because it prevented a person from adequately pro-
tecting himself. The statute held valid in Strickland v. State a5 was three
years later found insufficient, in Smith v. State, 30 to support the conviction
of defendant for carrying an unlicensed weapon on premises equivalent to
his home: the court noted that the statute should be given a reasonable inter-
pretation so as not to interfere with the right to bear arms.
Moreover, those courts which have adopted a sweeping rationale either up-
holding or invalidating legislation on "right to bear arms" grounds have
generally done their own cause a disservice by failing to note adequately the
reasons for the legislation or the nature of the right to bear arms. Bliss v.
Commonwealth,137 by holding the right to bear arms to be "absolute," failed
to take cognizance of the long history of arms regulation, and precipitated a
constitutional amendment in the state. Similarly, an early Texas court 3 8 sus-
tained a statute which established different penalties for assaults with dif-
ferent weapons, but posited this unfortunate dictum:
... The right of a citizen to bear arms, in the lawful defense of himself or the
state, is absolute. He does not derive it from the state government, but directly
from the sovereign convention of the people that framed the state government.
It is one of the "high powers" delegated directly to the citizens, and "is excepted
out of the general powers of government." A law cannot be passed to infringe
upon or impair it, because it is above the law, and independent of the law-making
power.o3
9
It took the Texas courts some years before they recognized any limitation on
the right.'
40
- 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921). To same effect, see Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga,
157 Tenn. 518, 11 S.W.2d 678 (1928); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 8 Am. Rep.
8 (1871).
"=31 Ark. 455 (1876).
18433 Ark. 557 (1878).
137 Ga. 1, 72 S.E. 260 (1911).
14 Ga. App. 823, 82 S.E. 355 (1914).
137 2 Litt. 90, 13 Am. Dec. 251 (Ky. 1822). See discussion, supra note 89.
18 Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394 (1859).
amId. at 401-02. (Emphasis added).
1,0 Cf. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872).
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Even the holding in City of Salina v. Blaksleyi4 ' (which is the leading ex-
ponent of the view that the right to bear arms is a "collective" rather than
"individual" right) seems unnecessarily broad. Written in 1905-before either
of the World Wars-the opinion suggests that the only right is to bear arms
as a member of the state militia. It thus eliminates the right to bear arms in
preparation for such service, or for personal defense, and to this extent dis-
agrees even with those states which allow the regulation of all but military-
type sidearms.
142
From this review we can detect in the state cases a wide divergence of ra-
tionales, and, in the later cases, a general paucity of discussion on the "right
to bear arms" issues. But it seems impossible to see any definable trend in the
opinions of the courts. As is apparent from the dates of the cases, few of them
are current; but the views expressed in the most recent cases often seem more
dated than the views in the earliest 19th century ones. For example, the view
expressed in Carlton v. State14 3-that the right to bear arms was not designed
as a shield for the individual man, but was a collective right of the populace-
had been iterated seventy-two years earlier in Aymette v. State. 44 Conversely,
an individual right to keep and bear arms has been found as late as 1936 in
People v. Nakamura'45 and in 1922 in People v. Zerillo.146 About all this writer
is willing to concede from this review is that the various state courts-if and
when called upon to determine the constitutionality of firearms legislation-
will react more to the specific language of the state constitution and the data
relied on by the legislature in enacting the law, than they will to a marshalling
of ancient precedents.
IV. CONCLUSION
Comes now the time to draw the thread of synthesis through the fabric of
discussion. From a historical viewpoint, the right to keep and bear arms is
indeed a phenomenon-and prior to 1688 it appears to have been a phantom
as well. That is, prior to the expression of a right to bear arms in the English
Declaration of Rights, there is no concrete evidence of its existence or its con-
tent. The circumstances of the England of 1688 reveal a major religious and
political upheaval, in which one of the items of oppression was the systematic
denial of weapons of resistance to Protestants. This "discrimination" en-
gendered in Parliament the declaration of a constitutional principle that
Protestants had a right to bear such arms "as [were] allowed by law." There
141 72 Kan. 230, 83 Pac. 619 (1905).
14 See cases cited supra, note 132.
' 63 Fla. 1, 58 So. 486 (1912).
'"21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154 (1840).
14599 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936).
' 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927 (1922).
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was implicit in the first constitutional statement of the right a recognition of
the "overlordship of the police power."
147
It also seems clear that the second amendment to the United States Consti-
tution was formulated in a similar period of strife and military impositions,
grounded four-square on a proven disregard for standing armies-a disregard
which had special meaning in colonial America, but which had long been
ingrained in the common law tradition. And it further appears that that tra-
dition had long tolerated a measure of regulation of firearms.
The available opinions of the federal courts confirm the view that the
second amendment guarantee for a right to bear arms is necessarily related to
the maintenance of the militia. Yet it seems obvious that home-spun military
preparedness is a myth today and has been for sometime; 148 there is then the
possibility that the guarantee contained in the second amendment is of little
significance as an inhibiting factor to proposed federal legislation for the
control of interstate traffic in firearms.
However, thirty-five states also guarantee the right to bear arms in one
form or another. Many of these provisions differ radically from their federal
counterpart, and have been so construed. Specifically, it is difficult to ignore
language which states that the right to bear arms extends to the protection
of "home, person and property." It is in these jurisdictions that legislatures
and courts will have to take a long hard look at the content of any gun law,
to ascertain whether it oversteps the limits of police power and invades a con-
stitutionally protected domain.
But what are the boundaries of that domain? It is highly unlikely that all
states will adopt a single interpretation of the right to bear arms, so that the
limits of the "right" may vary with the jurisdiction. Yet a single approach to
the problem of delineating the right seems possible, and it is this: the nature
of the right to bear arms should be expressed in terms of the purposes for
which firearms can conceivably be used.149 Once a protected purpose is identi-
fied, any legislation which leaves that purpose reasonably intact is valid. The
test adopted in the only Supreme Court case directly under the second amend-
ment' 50 was whether the arms regulated bore any reasonable relation to the
maintenance of the militia. Finding none, the Court ruled the statute valid.
1,7 People ex rel. Ferris v. Horton, 147 Misc. 506, 509, 264 N.Y.S. 84, 88 (1933).
,8 Almost a hundred years ago, a Tennessee court could say:
We may for a moment, pause to reflect on the fact, that what was once deemed a
stable and essential bulwark of freedom, "a well regulated militia," though the clause
still remains in our Constitutions, both State and Federal, has, as an organization,
passed away in almost every State of the Union, and only remains to us as a memory of
the past, probably never to be revived.
Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 184, 8 Am. Rep. 8, 17 (1871).
14S See supra note 10.
iSO United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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It may then be said that the "purpose" for which arms-bearing is protected
by the second amendment is military preparedness. It is wholly conceivable
that this "purposes" rationale will yield different results under the various
state constitutions-for example, the Colorado constitution extends the
right to "home, person and property": a protected purpose may then be the
defense of one's business establishment. Unless the Denver shopkeeper can
demonstrate that the challenged legislation deprives him of an effective means
of defending his store, the regulation is valid.
The proposed test hopefully achieves two ends (1) it avoids the meaningless
debate over whether the right to bear arms is a collective or individual right;
and (2) it furnishes a means of evaluating the constitutionality of proposed
regulations ahead of time through the legislative (data-gathering) process.
Much the same thought has been expressed by a recent student commentator:
No reason exists why a weapon should be available to the public that by reason-
able standards has no legitimate sporting, hunting or security utility, and has gen-
erally been adopted by criminals and undesirables to enhance their anti-social
behavior.'51
On the presumption that "sporting, hunting or security" are the protected
purposes, arms having no utility in those pursuits may be proscribed.152
Finally, if there is any discernible trend in the attitude of courts toward the
right to bear arms, it is an increasing sympathy for the problems of legislatures
in devising effective means to combat rampant crime or to eliminate recurring
safety hazards. For example, in 1840 a Tennessee court could say:
To hold that the Legislature could pass no law upon this subject by which to
preserve the public peace, and protect our citizens from the terror which a wanton
and unusual exhibition of arms might produce, or their lives from being en-
dangered by desperadoes with concealed arms, would be to make it a social evil
of infinitely greater extent to society than would result from abandoning the
right itself.153
And in 1959, the same thought persists:
Must a civilized society continue a tacit acceptance of the pervasive spirit of law-
lessness and force in its life?
The right to bear arms is a precious one, guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution. But while we are a society still pioneering in the realm of space and
m Note, 15 DE PAUL L. REv 164, 169 (1965).
152The protected purposes would probably be determined historically, in which case they
could hardly include anything more than militia preparedness and self-defense. The "pur-
poses" test, however, could be flexibly interpreted to allow for more or fewer purposes as
the times demand.
10 Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.) 154, 159 (1840).
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spirit, we are no longer a frontier community. The great master of the law
[Holmes] correctly observed that "Most rights are qualified"..., and this right,
too, is subject to regulation.
5 4
The freedom with which firearms are bought and sold and used cannot help
but contribute in some measure to these problems.
The first inclination of a court, therefore, will probably be to evaluate the
effectiveness of any gun control statute as a police measure. 155 If the court
finds it a reasonably effective attempt to abate some social evil, it can turn
to a number of theories to overcome a "right to bear arms" objection: (1) it
may find that the statute simply "regulates" and does not infringe (as, perhaps,
the "concealed weapons" statutes, or a licensing or registration requirement);
(2) the statute may be directed at weapons which in light of modern technology
could not increase the military proficiency of their owners (snub-nosed pistols,
sawed-off shotguns, etc.); (3) the legislation may be directed at persons who
could not reasonably be expected to serve in an organized military force; (4)
the statute may impose limitations which do not inhibit the ownership of
firearms for any constitutionally protected purpose (which could then safely
be extended to protection of self and property). And in those fifteen jurisdic-
tions which have adopted no specific "right to bear arms" provision, unless
and until the second amendment is found applicable to the states, it is at least
conceivable that their courts could simply deny the existence of any such
constitutional principle.
In fact, if one may speculate, it is not at all unlikely that a court may one
day develop a simpler test, by holding that the police power and the right to
bear arms are mutually exclusive constitutional concepts, and that therefore
any regulation which is by conventional standards a valid police measure
cannot, by that very fact, infringe the right to bear arms.
APPENDIX
State Const. Citation Text
Alabama art. I, sec. 26 That every citizen has a right to bear arms
in defense of himself and the state.
15 Application of Grauling, 183 N.Y.S.2d 654, 657 (1959).
15 Consider the approach of a Michigan court:
.... The police power of the State to preserve public safety and peace and to regulate
the bearing of arms cannot fairly be restricted to the mere establishment of conditions
under which all sorts of weapons may be privately possessed, but it may take account of
the character and ordinary use of weapons and interdict those whose customary em-
ployment by individuals is to violate the law. The power is, of course, subject to the
limitation that its exercise be reasonable, and it cannot constitutionally result in the
prohibition of the possession of those arms which, by the common opinion and usage
of law-abiding people, are proper and legitimate to be kept upon private premises for
the protection of person and property.
People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 541, 235 N.W. 245, 246-47 (1931).
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Alaska art. I, sec. 19 A well-regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.
Arizona art. 2, sec. 26 The right of the individual citizen to bear
arms in defense of himself or the State shall
not be impaired, but nothing in this section
shall be construed as authorizing individuals
or corporations to organize, maintain, or em-
ploy an armed body of men.
Arkansas art. 2, sec. 5 The citizens of this State shall have the right
to keep and bear arms for their common de-
fense.
Colorado art. II, sec. 13 The right of no person to keep and bear
arms in defense of his home, person and
property, or in aid of the civil power when
thereto legally summoned, shall be called in
question; but nothing herein contained shall
be construed to justify the practice of carry-
ing concealed weapons.
Connecticut art. I, sec. 15 Every citizen has a right to bear arms in de-
fense of himself and the state.
Florida Deel. of Rts., sec. 20 The right of the people to bear arms in de-
fense of themselves, and the lawful authority
of the state, shall not be infringed, but the
Legislature may prescribe the manner in
which they may be borne.
Georgia art. I, sec. I, The right of the people to keep and bear
para. XXII arms, shall not be infringed, but the General
Assembly shall have power to prescribe the
manner in which arms may be borne.
Hawaii art. I, sec. 15 A well regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.
Idaho art. I, sec. 11 The people have the right to bear arms for
their security and defense; but the legislature
shall regulate the exercise of this right by
law.
Indiana art. I, sec. 32 The people shall have a right to bear arms,
for the defense of themselves and the State.
Kansas Bill of Rts., sec. 4 The people have the right to bear arms for
their defense and security; but standing
armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to
liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and the
military shall be in strict subordination to
the civil power.
Kentucky sec. 1, para. 7 The right to bear arms in defense of them-
selves and of the state, subject to the power
of the general assembly to enact laws to pre-
vent persons from carrying concealed weap-
ons.
Louisiana art. I, sec. 8 A well-regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the
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Maine art. I, sec. 16









art. I, sec. 6
art. 3, sec. 12
art. I, sec. 23
art. III, sec. 13
art. II, sec. 6
art. I, sec. 24
art. I, sec. 4
people to keep and bear arms shall not be
abridged. This shall not prevent the passage
of laws to punish those who carry weapons
concealed.
Every citizen has a right to keep and bear
arms for the common defence; and this right
shall never be questioned.
The people have a right to keep and to bear
arms for the common defence. And as, in
time of peace, armies are dangerous to liber-
ty, they ought not to be maintained without
the consent of the legislature; and the mili-
tary power shall always be held in an exact
subordination to the civil authority, and be
governed by it.
Every person has a right to keep and bear
arms for the defense of himself and the state.
The right of every citizen to keep and bear
arms in defense of his home, person or prop-
erty, or in aid of the civil power when there-
to legally summoned, shall not be called in
question, but the legislature may regulate or
forbid carrying concealed weapons.
That the right of every citizen to keep and
bear arms in defense of his home, person and
property, or when lawfully summoned in
aid of the civil power, shall not be ques-
tioned; but this shall not justify the wearing
of concealed weapons.
The right of any person to keep or bear arms
in defense of his own home, person and
property or in aid of the civil power when
thereto legally summoned, shall not be called
in question, but nothing herein contained
shall be held to permit the carrying of con-
cealed weapons.
The people have the right to bear arms for
their security and defense, but nothing here-
in shall be held to permit the carrying of
concealed weapons.
A well regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed; and, as standing armies in time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought
not to be kept up, and the military should
be kept under strict subordination to, and
governed by, the civil power. Nothing herein
contained shall justify the practice of carry-
ing concealed weapons, or prevent the Legis-
lature from enacting penal statutes against
said practice.
The people have the right to bear arms for
their defence and security; but standing
armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to
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art. II, sec. 26
art. I, sec. 27
art. I, sec. 21
art. I, sec. 22
art. I, sec. 26
art. VI, sec. 24
art, I, sec. 26
art. I, sec. 23
art. I, sec. 6
chap. I, art. 16
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liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the
military shall be in strict subordination to
the civil power.
The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms
in defense of his home, person, or property,
or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto
legally summoned, shall never be prohibited;
but nothing herein contained shall prevent
the Legislature from regulating the carrying
of weapons.
The people have the right to bear arms for
the defence of themselves, and the State, but
the Military shall be kept in strict subordina-
tion to the civil power.
The right of the citizens to bear arms in
defence of themselves and the State shall not
be questioned.
The right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed.
A well regulated militia being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed. As in times of peace armies are
dangerous to liberty, they shall not be main-
tained without the consent of the General
Assembly. The military power of the State
shall always be held in subordination to the
civil authority and be governed by it. No
soldier shall in time of peace be quartered
in any house without the consent of the
owner, nor in time of war but in the manner
to be prescribed by law.
The right of citizens to bear arms in defense
of themselves and the state shall not be de-
nied.
That the citizens of the State have a right
to keep and to bear arms for their common
defense; but the Legislature shall have power,
by law, to regulate the wearing of arms,
with a view to prevent crime.
Every citizen shall have the right to keep
and bear arms in the lawful defence of him-
self or the State; but the Legislature shall
have power, by law, to regulate the wearing
of arms, with a view to prevent crime.
The people have the right to bear arms for
their security and defense, but the Legisla-
ture may regulate the exercise of this right
by law.
That the people have a right to bear arms
for the defence of themselves and the State
-and as standing armies in time of peace
are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to
be kept up; and that the military should be
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kept under strict subordination to and gov-
erned by the civil power.
Washington art. I, sec. 24 The right of the individual citizen to bear
arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall
not be impaired, but nothing in this section
shall be construed as authorizing individuals
or corporation to organize, maintain or em-
ploy an armed body of men.
Wyoming art. I, sec. 24 The right of citizens to bear arms in defense
of themselves and of the state shall not be
denied.
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